113, 185, 243, 311 Siberia RR1

[For a discussion of the Soviet agricultural program announced in the spring of 1954 to add some 70 million acres to the area of grain cultivation in western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, see 75: Jackson, R1 Soviet Union, entire source.]

1: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1954 RR1 Siberia RR1

THE FAR EASTERN TERRITORY

636 During the whole period from 1922 to 1937–38 the Soviet Far East enjoyed a special position within the Soviet Union. From the administrative point of view the Soviet Far East formed one large unit, the 'Far Eastern Territory' (F.E.T.). It covered roughly one-eighth of the entire surface of the U.S.S.R. The F.E.T. existed from January 1926 until October 1938, but there was a slight amputation of the territory in 1930, when the districts of Sreten and Chita were detached. Militarily, too, the Soviet Far East had a semi-independent existence by the establishment, in August 1929, of the Special Far Eastern Army ('Osobaya Dalnevostochnaya Armiya') usually referred to by its initials as ODVA and a year after its foundation as OKDVA (Osobaya Krasnoznamyonnaya Dalnevostochnaya Armiya', meaning 'Special Far Eastern Army decorated with the Order of the Red Banner').

Both army commanders and administrators in the Far East showed a considerable degree of independence, which, in some cases, even expressed itself in open opposition to the régime. This is true, in particular of the party leaders of Vladivostok, a city which, like that other opposition centre, Leningrad, was a window into the world. The radical course, aiming at the liquidation of the remnants of private property, which the Bolshevik Party took after its Fifteenth Congress (1927) did not meet with approval in a trading centre like Vladivostok. Both Vladivostok and Chita became, in the late twenties, strongholds of a right-wing opposition and the Central Committee in Moscow had to dismiss the local party chiefs.[3]

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●185 578 Difficulties between the centre and the Far Eastern communists continued after the suppression of the right-wing deviation. Problems connected with the implementation of the First and Second Five-Year Plans were an almost inexhaustible source of disagreements. Already during the first Five-Year Plan period the State Planning Commission in Moscow had worked out big development schemes for the Far East, providing for the building of additional railways, an increase of coal and oil production, and far-reaching industrialization. When it became clear that many of the envisaged projects could not be carried out neither Moscow nor Khabarovsk wanted to take the blame for the failure. The central authorities complained about the inefficiency of the 'Far Easterners' and the latter denounced the lack of understanding of the officials at the centre. At the Sixteenth Party Congress, which was held in 1930, the spokesman of the F.E.T., Perepechko, referred to the 'hideous attitude of various central organizations' towards the economic problems of the Far East.[4] If it were not for this negligence, Perepechko asserted, the F.E.T. would carry out the basic tasks of the Five-Year

1: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1954 RR1 Siberia RR1

185 578 Plan in three years. The later development showed that it took not three but ten years to reach the target figures which the first Five-Year Plan had fixed for the coal and oil production of the Far East.* The Central Government refused to admit that the shortcomings in the Far East resulted from deficiencies of all-Union planning, and tried to put the blame on local scapegoats who were charged with committing deliberate sabotage. More than that, the Central Government alleged that the Far Eastern administrators were 'Japanese spies', although they were, presumably, no more connected with Japan than the Leningrad opposition was linked with Germany. The Far Eastern communists, it is true, had shown great eagerness to establish commercial relations with other Pacific countries including Japan, but this had been done with the agreement of the centre.

THE PURGE OF THE 'CIVILIANS'

661 687 665 Although there was no evidence for charges of high treason the Soviet Government carried out a purge on a vast scale throughout the Soviet Far East. It would be incorrect to say that there was one big purge. There were at least two purges, one directed primarily against 'civilian' communists, and another aimed mainly at the army. The first purge, which was closely connected with economic shortcomings, started in the first months of 1937 and led to the disappearance of the head of the administration of the F.E.T., Krutov, and of the party secretary, Lavrentev. At the same time administrative heads and party officials were sacked all over the Soviet Far East. For many months there were no 'first secretaries' in many city committees and district committees of the Communist Party.

There is one aspect of the purge of the 'civilians' in the Far East which deserves special mention, the purge of the railwaymen. The railwaymen of the Far East were traditionally the backbone of the Communist Party in that distant part of the Soviet Union, and the solidity of Moscow's connection with the Pacific coastal areas depended largely on their efficiency. In the 'thirties' their job became increasingly difficult. Between 1933 and 1936 the freight turnover of the Far Eastern railways had increased three times. This was more than they could stand. The Far Eastern railway system broke down. A great many accidents occurred. The Government asserted that they were all engineered 'on instructions of the Japanese intelligence service.' The supreme responsibility for the wrecking of trains was officially attributed to Trotsky and to the

* Production of oil was to reach 464,000 tons by the end of the first Five-Year Plan in 1932. In 1933 output was 196,000 tons; in 1936, 308,000 tons, and in 1938, 360,000 tons. The coal target for 1932 was 4,000,000 tons. In 1933 output had reached 2,020,000 tons, and in 1936, 3,617,000 tons. The target for 1937 was 5,000,000 tons, but actual production in 1938 was only 4,750,000 tons.

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1: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1954 RR1 Siberia RR1

this early period of construction Komsomolsk had a street with the characteristic nickname of 'Street of Accidents', and a whole quarter was known as the 'Fire Settlement' ('Pozharny Posyolok').

Things in Komsomolsk went wrong for several years, and in 1937, when the city celebrated its fifth anniversary, the party authorities thought that the time had come to carry out a large-scale purge among the builders of the 'City of Youth'. One of the most distinguished citizens of the new town, the director of its metallurgical plant, then declared bluntly, 'We are mercilessly rooting out this scum of wreckers'.[19] 'This scum of wreckers' were people whom official Soviet propaganda had previously included among the selfless enthusiastic patriots engaged in self-sacrificing, heroic construction work. To justify the purge the party leadership alleged that 'agents of foreign intelligence services, bandits and diversionists' had penetrated into the ranks of workers and technicians of Komsomolsk, thanks to the complacency of certain leading personalities. According to the official version the 'enemies of the people' at work in Komsomolsk were very active and ingenious. They mixed concrete with sugar so that the degree of its cohesion was lowered, they put glass into ball-bearings to provoke accidents and destroyed vital blue-prints to delay the growth of local industry.

The real reason for the chaos in Komsomolsk was not the criminal activity of wreckers, but the lack of co-ordination between the various state trusts which owned the industrial enterprises in the town-to-be. Each of these trusts constructed a workers' settlement around its plant, and until 1940 there was no over-all building plan for the much advertised town of the Communist Youth League. This explains why sanitary conditions and municipal services were still practically non-existent, even by the outbreak of the Second World War.

The over-all building plan of Komsomolsk which came into being in 1940 provided for a population of 500,000.[20] Although the fulfilment of this aim is still far off, Komsomolsk has become an economic and cultural factor in the Far East. In 1947 the town had 100,000 inhabitants and was the proud owner of two undertakings of all-Union importance, the Iron and Steel Works, 'Amurstal', and a shipyard.[21] Cultural life, too, had developed greatly. The number of schools reached thirty-four in 1947 and forty-five in 1952. In addition, Komsomolsk has a Palace of Culture, a theatre, thirty libraries, a training college for teachers of secondary schools, a music school and four 'parks of culture and rest'.[22] It has tried to keep up its reputation as a 'City of Youth' and is still recruiting young workers from European Russia, particularly from among war orphans.

The second big Komsomol initiative for the settlement of the Far East, the Khetagurova movement, has its roots in the lack of women in the Far East and the necessity to remedy the situation. The well-

1: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1954 RR1 Siberia RR1

higher. Since the agents were remunerated on a 'piece rate basis', they were naturally interested in enlisting the largest possible number of people. One can well imagine that the recruiters made use of all sorts of glittering promises and also that they paid little attention to the character and abilities of the prospective Far Eastern colonists. The afore-mentioned Madame Khetagurova who exposed in a Moscow journal this 'recruitment racket', concluded her account laconically: 'And so it happened that quite a lot of scum was sent to the Far East'.[24]

Those consenting to go to the Far East as free workers received upon leaving Moscow or another city of European Russia a special bonus and a maintenance allowance covering the entire long journey from European Russia to their final place of destination. The total amount of bonuses and allowances thus earned might not have meant a great deal to a Western worker, but it was a considerable sum for the impoverished Soviet citizen of the 'thirties.' It was tempting and led to abuses. Quite a number of people cashed the special remuneration, went to the Far East, worked there for a while and got themselves discharged for reasons of health. Having returned to Moscow they let themselves be recruited once more for the Far East by another state trust and the whole game started again from the beginning.

The majority of the voluntary colonists who, up to the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, came to the Soviet Far East established themselves in towns. The two largest cities of the Soviet Far East, Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, therefore grew considerably. Between 1926 and 1939 the population of Khabarovsk increased from 52,000 to 199,000, and that of Vladivostok from 108,000 to 206,000.

As a consequence of the growth of the existing towns and the foundation of new ones such as Komsomolsk, Magadan and Birobidzhan City, the relation between the urban and rural population in the Far East changed to the detriment of the villages. In 1926 only 24 per cent of the population of the Far East lived in towns, but by 1939 over half of all 'Far Easterners' could be classified as 'urban'.

The encouragement of the urban population in the Far Eastern provinces led to neglect of agriculture. During the period of the First and Second Five-Year Plans the area under cultivation in the Soviet Far East diminished by over 20 per cent, from 2,848,000 acres in 1928 to 2,223,000 acres in 1938. Consequently, instead of providing more for the newcomers, the food supply for the Soviet Far East became more dependent on deliveries from areas thousands of miles away. This created an unsatisfactory situation not only from the narrow economic point of view but also from the military which demanded complete self-sufficiency in fuel, raw materials and food. Molotov himself proclaimed the principal of self-sufficiency for the Soviet Far East at the Eighteenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, in March 1939, and

1: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1954 RR1 Siberia RR1

demanded, in particular, 'full liquidation' of all shortcomings in Far Eastern agriculture. The Third Five-Year Plan, therefore, aimed at an increase of the agricultural population of the Far East. About 100,000 new collective farmers were to settle down in the Khabarovsk Territory[25] alone.

The outbreak of the war prevented the full implementation of the resettlement plan, but it was, at least, successfully started. Russian peasants went to the Far East mainly from the Provinces of Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh, Ryazan, Stalingrad, Tambov and Penza. Kursk and Oryol seem to have led the migration movement. There was a great deal of propaganda for the resettlement plan and during a certain period almost every single issue of the Moscow newspapers carried a news-item showing how well those farmers had fared who had consented to go to the Far East, and how heartily they had been received there by the old-timers. The big All-Union Agricultural Exhibition which was opened in Moscow on the eve of the Second World War was likewise put into the service of the resettlement campaign. The Far Eastern pavilion of the exhibition illustrated, with the help of statistics and pictures, all the delights of peasant life east of Lake Baikal. In addition, the pavilion served as a convenient place for officially organized meetings at which collective farmers of the Chita Province, and the Khabarovsk and Maritime Territories talked to peasants of European Russia about the advantages of Far Eastern agriculture.[26] These propaganda efforts were not in vain. In fact, the resettlement plan for 1940 was already fulfilled by October of that year,[27] and numerous peasant settlers also went to the Far East in the first half of 1941, continuing to do so almost until the Hitlerite invasion of the Soviet Union.

Peasant colonization in the Far East was resumed after the war. Its precise extent is not known. Official Soviet sources have shrouded it in mystery and apparently consider it a military secret. In the absence of reliable statistics a rough, and not necessarily accurate, estimate about the increase in the population of the Soviet Far East can only be made by a comparison of the numbers of constituencies which were created for the elections of 1937, 1946 and 1950. There was hardly any change between 1937 and 1946. For the Supreme Soviet elections in 1937 the F.E.T. was subdivided into nine constituencies, each of them representing a theoretical population of 300,000. The total population of the Far East in the narrower sense (including Sakhalin) was, thus, 2,700,000. In 1946 the Khabarovsk and Maritime Territories comprised nine constituencies on the Asiatic mainland, whilst a tenth constituency was formed by Sakhalin and the Kurile archipelago. The total population of the Soviet Far East at the beginning of 1946 could, therefore, hardly have exceeded 2,700,000 on the Asiatic continent or 3,000,000, including the Soviet island possessions in the Pacific.

131 The pivot of this circle in its movement from north to south, from the mouth of the Amur to Tientsin, lies in Transbaykal, from which radiate the main traffic lines in these directions. The radius of this circle has currently been shortened by the airline from 2,250 kilometers to around 1,600 kilometers.

If Transbaykal thus represents the point of departure for the power position of the Soviet Union, this region's large share in the total area of the Far East constitutes a foundation; for through this region the Soviet Union has also become an East Asian land power, which is undoubtedly very conscious of its position as such. The fact that Manchuria is surrounded /by Russia/ on the northwest, north, and east and the fact that the railroad lines to Vladivostok and Dalny' /Dairen/ run through Manchuria brought this Chinese region under the economic influence of the Russians even in Czarist times. When as a result of the outcome of World War II the Russians won back the positions in Manchuria which they lost from 1903 to 1940, the Russians were again in possession of or had the use of the main railroad lines in Manchuria and the harbors in /14/ southern Manchuria. This means for the Soviet Union again an extension of her economic sphere of influence, which at least equals that of the Czarist empire at the time of its greatest power, and even far exceeds this if consideration is taken of the political events and proceedings of the last few years in East Asia.

• 185 311 In this the strength of the Soviet Russian position in East Asia depends essentially on the development of her own Far Eastern regions. The present state of colonization and the economy both in Transbaykal and in the real Far Eastern regions shows that these are only at the beginning of their development. Up to now only a small percentage of the land suitable for agriculture has been brought under cultivation, and the exploitation of the natural resources has begun only in small areas. However, the progress which has been made in these spheres even during the Soviet regime reveals that this regime is determined to continue to give the necessary stress and upsurge to the favorable beginnings. The preferred, planned colonization shows this; and the tendency apparent in recent years to lead stronger forces into the industrial sector also indicates that the Soviet Union has the intention of creating in these regions a balanced economy in which all natural resources are given equal recognition. The planned economy of the Soviet Union, which intends to give as self-sufficient as possible a position to all the large economic areas, is especially

clearly manifest here; indeed, the distance and the remoteness of this region from the economic centers of the total union even force them to pursue this policy. In this, a role is not only played by the basic thought of populating these remote but well-situated regions, but also of making them as self-sufficient and strong economically as possible. The opportunities which are given the Soviet Union here cannot be estimated. They are great; only time is required to exploit them.

In connection with the above statement the unique position which the Far Eastern transportation network occupies within the Soviet Union as a whole, deserves to be brought out. A look at the map shows that the entire, complicated railroad network in the western part of the Soviet Union comes together into a single railroad line as it heads toward the Far East. This crosses the Yenisey at Krasnoyarsk and runs as far as Ulan-Ude in Transbaykal. Only here does it begin to split up and to develop into a transportation network, insofar as one can speak of such a thing in the Far East. On this single railroad line, which does, however, have two tracks, depends the entire connection of Transbaykal and the Far Eastern region with the rest of the Soviet Union. Even the completion of the Baykal-Amur line does not eliminate the bottleneck at Krasnoyarsk, and accordingly /15/, a certain self-sufficiency is the result of the development of the railroad network in the Far East.

Transbaykal and the Far Eastern region represent the extreme border position of the Soviet Union in East Asia. As remote border regions, they are really the Far East for the European part of Russia. One sees the sun rise and set eight times before one, coming from Leningrad in the Siberian Express, reaches Chita, the capital of Transbaykal, and another day and a half passes before one arrives in Vladivostok. More than 8,000 kilometers by air lie between the western and eastern borders of the Soviet Union. Chita is 6,236 kilometers by railroad from Moscow; Vladivostok is 9,333 kilometers from Moscow via Khabarovsk, and still 8,312 kilometers via the north Manchurian line by direct route.

But even within the Soviet Far East, a distance which seems extraordinary to the European has to be covered to travel from one end to the other. There are around 2,500 kilometers between the southwestern tip of Lake Baykal and the mouth of the Amur, and the airline from Pos'yet Bay, southwest of Vladivostok, to Cape Dezhnev on the Bering Strait is almost 5,000 kilometers long. Sakhalin Island

Soviet Union can rely on rich experience in the execution of projects of this type. Sufficient preparations in this direction have been made, as is summarized in the Atlas of Sources of Energy in the USSR, and from these preparations it can be seen what significant sources of energy, precisely in water power, still lie unused. The potential energy of water power in the Buryat-Mongol ASSR is estimated to be 7 million kilowatts. Chita Oblast is considered to be less favorable. The other Far Eastern regions are all the more richly equipped: their energy is reckoned to be 31 million kilowatts.

The Processing Industry

Some of the various branches of the processing industry have already been mentioned in the discussion of the raw material concerned. This applies especially to the wood and fish industries, which far exceed all other industrial branches, both in the number of plants and in the number of employees in these plants. From the extraordinary wealth of fish and wood it follows that the Far Eastern regions can not only supply themselves with these products but also that with their surplus they can contribute significantly in increasing measure to the supplying of the other parts of the Soviet Union. Wood, wood products, fish, and fish goods, therefore, form also the principal freighted goods which are sent out of the Far Eastern regions. World War II has had an extraordinary influence /177/ on the development of the other branches of industry. Various plants which had been moved to the Far East remained there after the end of the war; other plants were newly created or switched to another type of production in order to replace the loss in production in the areas affected by the war or also to ensure their own needs. Thus the supply situation today is generally more favorable than before World War II, and after this war it has been further improved by the erection of new installations.

In the selection of the location of the industrial plants the same principle apparently appears again and again. This principle is to so distribute these plants regionally in the vast area of the Far Eastern regions so that long transportation hauls are avoided as much as possible. The goal of this planning is to so equip the various areas with industrial plants so that each region can supply its own principal needs. The best example of this is the city of Magadan, from which the mining districts on the upper Kolyma are supplied and whose harbor is free of ice for scarcely six months. Besides repair installations for ocean-going ships